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A manufacturer of a patented salt-processing machine re-
quires lessees to use only salt purchased from the manufactur-
er.1 A film distributor selling the rights to broadcast Casablanca
requires television stations to also purchase the immensely less
popular Tugboat Annie Sails Again.2 What do these seemingly
disparate cases have in common? Both are examples of illegal
"tie-ins," defined by the Supreme Court as restrictive agreements
by a seller with market power (the "tier") that condition the sale
of a more attractive product (the "tying product") on the buyer's
promise to buy some other product (the "tied product").3 Howev-
er, this definition includes some tie-ins that the Court has ruled
legal. For example, a publishing company can require that adver-
tisers purchase space in both its morning and evening newspa-
pers.4 And in a recent opinion, the Supreme Court implied that
while a tie-in of copier parts with copier service might be illegal,
a tie-in of copiers with copier parts and service would not be.5
Such opinions are difficult to reconcile and lead to confusion
among businesses, lawyers, lower courts, and arguably the
Supreme Court itself. To distinguish beneficial tie-ins from
harmful ones, courts rely on a set of arbitrary legal definitions
unsuited for the task. To make matters worse, the standard for
per se illegality of tie-ins has shifted over time, becoming increas-
ingly confused in the wake of Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No.
2 v Hyde.6
Economists have identified several reasons why many tie-ins,
though illegal under current antitrust doctrine, are actually
beneficial to society. This Comment identifies another socially
t B.. 1991, Brandeis University; J.D. Candidate 1994, The University of Chicago.
1 International Salt Co., Inc. v United States, 332 US 392, 394 (1947).
2 United States v Loew's Inc., 371 US 38, 41-42 (1962).
See Northern Pacific Railway Co. v United States, 356 US 1, 5-6 (1958).
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v United States, 345 US 594, 624 (1953).
Eastman Kodak Co. v Image Technical Services, Inc., 112 S Ct 2072, 2078 (1992).
Compare id at 2096 (Scalia dissenting) (noting that "this makes no sense").
6 466 US 2 (1984).
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useful purpose served by tie-ins: in certain circumstances, they
can help solve collective action problems. These problems have
been recognized in other antitrust contexts, most notably in
resale price maintenance cases. In the tie-in context, collective
action problems are especially likely to lead to tying arrange-
ments beneficial to consumers in cases where the seller has no
"economic interest" in the tied product-for example, where a
fast-food franchisor requires franchisees to purchase supplies
from an unaffiliated seller.7
In the past, courts distinguished non-economic interest cases
from other tie-ins by refusing to impose liability without a
finding of a direct "economic interest" in the sale of the tied
product. More recent decisions have undermined or even abol-
ished the economic interest requirement, resulting in potential
liability and litigation expenses for harmless transactions.8
Analysis of the economic interest cases has further, unrealized
'implications for tie-in cases involving a seller who is not trying to
dominate the tied product market, even though the seller has a
direct economic interest in the sale of the tied product.
To better understand the approach that courts should take in
dealing with tie-ins aimed at solving collective action problems,
this Comment will first examine what tie-ins are and how compa-
nies employ them to resolve, among other issues, collective action
problems. The Comment will then examine the history of the
economic interest test, and will explain how courts have recently
shorn it from its original doctrinal and economic moorings. By
reviving the economic interest test in its original form-and thus
reclassifying a class of beneficial tie-ins from per se illegal to per
se legal-much needless litigation could be avoided. Restoring the
original test and applying it to tie-in cases outside the collective
action sphere should also help rationalize tie-in doctrine generally.9
' See, for example, Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v Diversified Packaging Corp., 549
F2d 368, 377 (5th Cir 1977).
' Compare Gonzalez v St. Margaret's House Housing Development Fund Corp., 880
F2d 1514 (2d Cir 1989) (rejecting an economic interest requirement), with Beard v
Parkview Hospital, 912 F2d 138, 144 (6th Cir 1990) (refusing to prohibit an arrangement
without a direct economic benefit to the seller of tying product). See also Note, The Eco-
nomic Interest Requirement in the Per Se Analysis of Tying Arrangements: A Worthless
Inquiry, 58 Fordham L Rev 1353 (1990); Casenote, Antitrust-The Absence of an Economic
Interest Requirement in Tying Arrangements, 63 Temple L Rev 595 (1990).
' For a more complete inquiry into the need for per se legality rules in antitrust, see
Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 Georgetown L J 305
(1987).
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I. ECONOMIC THEORY
A. Tie-ins and Other Antitrust Issues
Because antitrust laws seek to regulate economic behavior, it
is not surprising that economic analysis informs the study of
antitrust doctrine. Courts have defined standards for antitrust in
ways not always consistent with economic theory. " Since the
early years of the Burger era, the Supreme Court has proven
increasingly willing to discard aspects of antitrust doctrine that
are economically unsound." The courts continue to lag behind
economists, however, in their treatment of tie-in cases.
Courts have often deemed tie-ins invalid on the basis of what
might be called the "leverage argument." Proponents of this argu-
ment believe that a seller possessing market power with respect
to one product can sometimes leverage that power on behalf of a
second product in another market. By so leveraging its way into
the second market, the seller unfairly restrains trade. To limit
the monopolist's ability to reap these "leveraging gains," the
argument concludes, a per se ban on tying arrangements is nec-
essary." While only implicit in some of the early cases dealing
10 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1 (1984) (tension
exists because people litigate new business practices before economists fully analyze
them). See also, more generally, Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U Pa L Rev 925 (1979); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic
Perspective (Chicago, 1976); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (Basic Books, 1978).
i See E. Thomas Sullivan and Jeffrey L. Harrison, Understanding Antitrust and its
Economic Implications § 4.02 at 73-74 (Matthew Bender, 1988). For examples of the
Court's greater willingness to weigh economic factors instead of relying on traditional per
se analysis, see Brooke Group Ltd. v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S Ct 2578,
2588 (1993) (stating that "below-cost pricing... is of no moment to the antitrust laws if
competition is not injured"); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475
US 574, 594-595 (1986); NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US
85, 98-104 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 US 1,
13 (1979); United States v United States Gypsum Co., 438 US 422, 456 (1978).
' See generally M.L. Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw U L Rev 62
(1960); James M. Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis,
30 L & Contemp Probs 552 (1965); Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through
Leverage, 85 Colum L Rev 515, 516-17 (1985).
1994] 641
642 The University of Chicago Law Review [61:639
with tie-ins," the leverage argument has become explicit in
more recent cases.'4
Courts' hostility to tie-ins also stems from the claim that tie-
ins increase barriers to entry in the tied product market. 5
When the tier has no economic interest in the tied goods, the
barrier to entry should not be of concern; manufacturers of the
tied goods face no more barriers when competing to sell to the
tier than they would in normal competition. 6
Economists criticize tie-in law because of its foundations in
theories of leverage and entry-barriers. For example, Judge
Posner rejects the notion that it is possible to use leverage in
such a way to gain additional monopoly profits.' A monopolist
cannot create additional power where none exists. For example, if
a person is willing to pay $10 for a minute of computer time and
a hundred punch cards, it is irrelevant how the computer time or
punch cards are priced, so long as the total price does not exceed
$10. The monopolist will not make any additional profit from
having a second monopoly, for if she raises the price on the tied
product (the punch cards), she will have to lower it on the tying
product (the computer time). In fact, the variation in pricing may
well reduce allocative losses from the level resulting had the
Henry v A- B. Dick Co., 224 US 1, 53 (1912) (White dissenting) (observing that by
allowing a patentee to extend its patent rights over other, unpatented products, the Court
was enabling patentees to "multiply monopolies at [ I will"); Motion Picture Patents Co. v
Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 243 US 502, 517-18 (1917) (preventing the holder of a
patent on movie projection equipment from requiring its licensees to use only film made
by the patent holder); United Shoe Machinery Corp. v United States, 258 US 451, 457-58
(1922) (finding that tying requirements by an equipment manufacturer extended its
monopoly). See also Posner, Antitrust Law at 172 (cited in note 10); Kaplow, 85 Colum L
Rev at 515.
14 Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 14 (if leverage "is used to impair competition on the
merits in another market, a potentially inferior product may be insulated from competi-
tive pressures"). But see Alaska Airlines, Inc. v United Airlines, Inc., 948 F2d 536, 545
(9th Cir 1991) (rejecting leverage argument in context of a monopolization claim).
15 Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 14; Lawrence A. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of
Antitrust 447-48 (West, 1977). But see Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 374-75 (cited in note 10)
(noting that the most a monopolist can do is slow eventual entry, and even that is unlike-
ly). Compare Kaplow, 85 Colum L Rev at 536-39 (claiming that concern over delayed
entry lies at the "very heart" of the antitrust laws).
'6 Posner, Antitrust Law at 173. This analysis may be incomplete. If the tier has
monopoly power, there remains the possible problem of "monopsony," a market of a single
buyer and multiple sellers. In a monopsony, the buyer (in this case, or monopolist in the
tying good) has market power to extract a favorable price from the competitive suppliers,
leading to dislocations in the market.
17 Id at 172-73. But see Kaplow, 85 Colum L Rev at 525-39 (criticizing the "Chicago
School of Antitrust Analysis" and arguing that leverage is possible under certain circum-
stances).
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monopolist been unable to tie. 8 The monopolist will be able to
charge $9 for the computer time and $1 for the cards or $6 for
the computer time and $4 for the cards, but she will not be able
to charge the high price for both, for the consumer is only willing
to pay a total of $10 for the combination of the two.
Judge Posner further criticizes the conventional analysis of
tie-ins. What is it, he asks, that makes a mimeograph machine
and its ink "separate" products, but an automobile and its radia-
tor a single product? Since all products have components, the
judicial system could have a "devastating" reach through tie-in
prosecutions, because of the lack of a satisfactory test to distin-
guish tied from single products. 9 Posner notes that other mo-
nopoly laws address attempted monopolization through leverage.
Thus, he suggests, tie-in doctrine should be limited to tie-ins that
price discriminate-that is, those tie-ins that sell the same prod-
uct to different customers at different prices even though the cost
of sale is the same to each of them.2" Judge Bork goes even fur-
ther, arguing that "we have no acceptable theory of harm done by
these phenomena."2
But even assuming, as a number of economists do, that a
tying monopolist cannot hurt consumers through leveraging or by
imposing entry barriers, we might ask why any rational profit-
maximizing monopolist would ever tie. If price discrimination
were the only rational motivation for a tie, that would seem to be
reason enough to prohibit the tie-in. However, price discrimina-
tion is not the only reason for a tie. Economists point to several
reasons why a monopolist would find a tie-in profitable and why
consumers would find them beneficial:22 evasion of regulation,"
"' See Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 375 (arguing that price discrimination can lead to
similar outcomes as competitive industries).
Posner, Antitrust Law at 181.
o Id at 62, 183. But see Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 380-81.
21 Antitrust Paradox at 380-81.
Id at 372, 380-81.
A seller subject to some sort of price regulation might try to evade that regulation
through the use of a tied good in an unregulated market. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L J 19, 21-23 (1957); Bork, Antitrust
Paradox at 376; Roger D. Blair and David L. Kaserman, Antitrust Economics 383-84
(Richard D. Irwin, 1985). See also Alfred E. Kahn, 1 The Economics of Regulation 28 n 20
(IT, 1988) (discussing how public utility companies have evaded profit restraints by
paying excessive prices to unregulated affiliates); Richard A. Posner and Frank H.
Easterbrook, Antitrust: Cases, Economic Notes, and Other Materials 809 (West, 2d ed
1981) (describing how a gasoline station used a tie-in arrangement to circumvent gov-
ernment price controls on gasoline; the station required consumers who bought gas at the
low controlled price to buy a rabbit's foot at an inflated price). Regulation evasion can
include price floor evasion. For example, before the deregulation of the airline industry,
1994]
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non-discriminatory measurement of use,' economies of scale,'
and goodwill. Even in the case of price discrimination, the
firm's gain from the tie comes out of the deadweight loss of mo-
nopoly, not from any redistribution from consumers to monopolists."
some airlines offered remarkable package deals on car rentals and the like. Id at 809 n 8.
See, for example, Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 732
F2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir 1984). Nevertheless, a seller would be unlikely to make such a tie
mandatory, so though the tie might once have been illegal, see Northern Pacific Railway,
356 US 1, it would not currently be illegal under Jefferson Parish's notion of "forcing." See
text accompanying notes 74-82.
Northern Pacific Railway, where a sale of land was tied to a railroad service, may
best be explained as an effort to evade a regulatory price that was set too high. But see
Kaplow, 85 Colum L Rev at 522 n 26 (cited in note 12) (criticizing the Chicago School's
defense of a practice when the underlying motive for the practice is illegal). The resulting
regulation of ties to enforce other regulatory restraints is a good example of how regula-
tion must continuously expand jurisdiction to prevent evasion. See Alfred E. Kahn, 2
Economics of Regulation 28-32 (MIT, 1988) (discussing this "regulatory creep").
24 Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 378 (cited in note 10). In measurement-of-use cases
(situations where the seller's costs vary with the use her machine receives), a tie-in will
simply recover costs of service, rather than act as a mechanism for price discrimination.
2 Id at 378-79. Economies of scale almost certainly explain the Times-Picayune case,
345 US 594, though the Court in part ruled on the grounds that there was no tie because
the morning and evening newspapers sold the same product: the readership "bought" by
advertisers. Id at 613. Such reasoning, of course, only demonstrates the dangerous mal-
leability of the "separate product" conception of tie-in law.
' Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 379-80. See, for example, the rejected arguments of the
defendants in International Business Machines Corp. v United States, 298 US 131, 134
(1936), and Eastman Kodak, 112 S Ct at 2091.
Posner, Antitrust Law at 173-84 (cited in note 10); Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 376-
378. Kaplow argues that this rationale is an illegitimate one, because price discrimination
is illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act. 85 Colum L Rev at 522-23, citing 15 USC § 13
(1982) (§ 2 of the Clayton Act, amended by the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, ch 592, 49
Stat 1526). But this is a false argument. The "price discrimination" prohibited by the Rob-
inson-Patman Act should not be equated with what economists call price discrimination,
and Kaplow has confused the two different concepts. The economic definition of price dis-
crimination is "selling at a price or prices such that the ratio of price to marginal cost is
different in different sales," Posner, Antitrust Law at 62 n 35, while the Robinson-Patman
Act only prohibits "price differences" that are unjustified. See FTC v Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
363 US 536, 549 (1960). See Richard A. Posner, The Robinsol-Patman Act: Federal
Regulation of Price Differences (American Enterprise Institute, 1976).
Ironically, one of the possible benefits of tie-ins given in Jefferson Parish, 466 US at
12-that "[bluyers often find package sales attractive"-has little economic justification.
That buyers find a package sale attractive is no reason for courts to distinguish one tie-in
from others. Unless other already-mentioned factors are at work, there is no harm to con-
sumers if a manufacturer offers a choice: buy the goods separately or buy them as a
package. Perhaps the Court intefided to say that offering a package in addition to the
option of taking the goods separately creates no tie-in problem. Id at 12 n 17, citing
Northern Pacific Railway, 356 US at 6 n 4. Another plausible explanation is that the
Court was really referring to the sale of two "inseparable" products as a single product,
such as a left shoe and a right shoe, and calling such a sale a "package." This ambiguity
further illustrates how courts often become confused in their attempts to create a coher-
ent tie-in policy.
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B. Why Would a Dealer Tie Without Economic Interest?
Collective Action Problems and Some Cases
In Miller Motors v Ford Motor Co.2' and other economic in-
terest cases discussed below, courts have ruled that purported
tie-ins were not illegal because the sellers in question did not
have an economic interest in the tied product markets. But if
there was no economic interest, why would a seller ever choose to
tie? Aside from the reasons already mentioned, a seller might
choose to tie to resolve a collective action problem. This subsec-
tion discusses collective action problems, both in general and in
the context of antitrust law, before turning to the collective ac-
tion problem at the heart of Miller Motors and other economic
interest and tie-in cases.
1. Collective action problems.
Pollution is a classic example of a collective action problem.
Residents of a smog-ridden city might wish to require all drivers
to equip their cars with costly emission-control devices in order to
reduce pollution. But without an enforced agreement or law, too
many car owners will not install the devices voluntarily. The
hundreds of dollars spent on any single device will bring at least
that much benefit to all residents of the area, yet the individual
benefit to any one person will be small. Individuals have an in-
centive to "free ride" off of their neighbors' devices; Nigel cannot
prevent Steve from enjoying the cleaner air that results from
Nigel's emission-controlled car. A law requiring cars to have
emissions controls removes the option of free riding, and thus
everyone is better off.29
Through a tie-in, a seller likewise removes certain options
from consumers' menu of choices. Therefore, courts assessing the
validity of a particular tie-in should ask whether consumers
would prefer in advance not to have the option available to them,
just as Nigel and Steve surely would have preferred not to be
allowed to engage in the self-destructive behavior of polluting.
28 252 F2d 441 (4th Cir 1958).
' This conclusion, of course, assumes that the benefits of the hypothetical environ-
mental statute outweigh the costs of the emission-control devices.
1994]
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2. Collective action problems in antitrust law.
Collective action problems arise in a number of circumstanc-
es in antitrust law, most notably in resale price maintenance
cases.3" Resale price maintenance is the practice whereby a
manufacturer forbids its dealers from reselling its goods below a
certain price, to ensure that the dealers will be able to afford to
provide services to consumers. Without resale price maintenance,
some dealers might attempt to free ride off of other dealers who
do provide services. The free riders, because they do not incur the
costs of providing services to consumers, can price their products
below the prices that dealers who do offer service must charge. A
customer could solicit technical advice and information from a
full-service dealer, and then make his purchase from a free-riding
dealer. The end result is that no dealer will pay the extra cost of
providing services.
The Supreme Court at first failed to distinguish resale price
maintenance from ordinary price-fixing and declared it and its
economic equivalent, exclusive service territories,"' per se illegal
in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v John D. Park & Sons Co. and United
States v Arnold Schwinn & Co. 2 After much criticism, the Court
reversed Schwinn in Continental T.V., Inc. v GTE Sylvania Inc.,
holding that exclusive service territories would be decided under
the rule of reason.33 A class of boycott/refusal-to-deal cases also
fits within the same paradigm of a manufacturer facing antitrust
' See the discussion of resale price maintenance in Posner, Antitrust Law at 147-66
(cited in note 10).
"1 An exclusive service territory protects a dealer from competition from other dealers
within a certain geographic area. A resale price maintenance policy protects dealers from
being undersold by other dealers. If anything, exclusive service territories restrict trade
further than resale price maintenance; the latter says "Dealer X may not sell widgets
below price Y in territory Z," while the former says "Dealer X may not sell widgets in
territory Z," thereby preventing even so much as non-price competition.
3' Dr. Miles Medical Co. v John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 US 373 (1911) (resale price
maintenance); United States v Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 US 365 (1967) (exclusive
service territories).
' 433 US 36, 58-59 (1977). Under the rule of reason, the court performs a fact-
specific analysis: 'The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition." Chicago Board of Trade v United States, 246 US
231, 238 (1918).
Resale price maintenance, though, is still per se illegal, even though it has no worse
an effect than the granting of exclusive service territories. Of course, under current anti-
trust law, if the manufacturer is also the dealer, it can sell at whatever price it chooses.
Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division II, 75 Yale L J 373, 429-64 (1966); Posner, Antitrust Law at 160.
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liability for attempting to prevent distributors from free riding off
the efforts of other distributors.34
3. Collective action problems in tie-in cases: The Miller
Motors case.
In Miller Motors, Ford Motor Company "encouraged and
aided" the formation of Lincoln-Mercury Dealers Advertising
Funds (LMDAs), entities comprised of Lincoln-Mercury dealers
and distinct from Ford itself. 5 To raise money with which to
promote Ford's new line of Lincoln-Mercury cars, each LMDA
made compulsory assessments of five to sixty dollars on cars
provided to dealers by Ford.36 The assessments were collected by
Ford as part of the price it charged for each car. They were then
turned over to the respective LMDAs, which, in turn, spent the
money on advertising through the advertising firm of Kenyon and
Eckhardt. The advertising firm had no corporate relationship
with Ford. 7 Ford made it clear that it would terminate franchis-
es of dealers who refused to participate in the LMDA.'
Why should Ford care if dealers refused to give money to an
advertising firm that had nothing to do with Ford? As in the case
of the emission-control devices that benefitted all of the city resi-
dents regardless of whether or not their own car was equipped
with one, the national advertising fund was a benefit to all Lin-
coln-Mercury dealers, and, by extension, to Ford.
The collective action aspects of Miller Motors are fairly
straightforward. Assume that participation in the LMDA was
voluntary. Dealers will either choose to fund a LMDA, or they
will not. In either situation, Miller Motors will choose not to join
the LMDA and to free ride on whatever LMDA contributions
other dealers make. If dealers do fund a full-fledged LMDA, Mill-
er has the incentive to cheat rather than let other dealers benefit
from its contribution. If Miller alone decides to advertise nation-
ally, its efforts are misplaced, and it will not reap the benefit of
its altruism. Thus, Miller will choose not to contribute to a
LMDA.
Consider now that each of the other dealers is similarly situ-
ated to Miller Motors. For each and every dealer, it is more bene-
' See, for example, United States v General Motors Corp., 384 US 127 (1966).
3 252 F2d at 444.
"Id at 443-44.
37 Id at 444.
'8Id at 445.
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ficial to become a free rider and to refuse to contribute to a
LMDA. Whether or not the other dealers contribute, it will be
more profitable for any single dealer to choose not to contribute:
although one marginal dollar of contribution will generate mar-
ginal revenues of one dollar, those revenues will be spread among
all dealers. Thus, each dealer will choose not to contribute to a
LMDA. As a result, both Ford and its dealers are worse off than
they would have been if all dealers had joined a LMDA. Each
dealer profits less than it would have otherwise, and Ford sells
fewer Lincoln-Mercury cars. The dealers could attempt to organ-
ize and set up a common pool of advertising, but free-rider prob-
lems would remain. The more dealers, the greater the coordina-
tion and collective action problem would be. Without any system
of enforcement, a nationwide advertising program would be im-
possible.39
Even if dealers are not similarly situated, one need only
make the reasonable assumption that some dealers at the margin
will find it unprofitable to sell cars without LMDA support. Be-
cause of the collective action problem, all of the dealers will re-
fuse to form a LMDA. The optimal strategy for some dealers will
be to terminate the franchise and refuse to sell Lincoln-Mercury
cars. Fewer dealers will result in less competition, hurting con-
sumers.
Now return to the facts of Miller Motors, in which Ford effec-
tively created a tying arrangement whereby a dealer does not
have the option of having a Lincoln-Mercury franchise if it refus-
es to participate in a LMDA. If Miller Motors refuses to pay into
an existing LMDA, it can no longer free ride off of other dealers'
contributions, because Ford will terminate its franchise. The tie-
' One might complain at this point that though Lincoln-Mercury dealers are techni-
cally engaged in commerce with Ford, the focus of the analysis and the intent of antitrust
laws should be aimed more at the effect on the end consumer, rather than on the level of
profit received by intermediaries and manufacturers. The debate on this issue is cut
somewhat short by the Supreme Court's decision interpreting Section 4 of the Clayton
Act, 15 USC § 15 (1982), in Illinois Brick Co. v Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977). In Illinois
Brick, the Court held that, with some exceptions, consumers can sue for damages due to a
price-fixing agreement only if they have directly purchased from the alleged wrongdoer. Id
at 746-47. Resolving the controversy over Illinois Brick lies beyond the scope of this
Comment. Compare, for example, Robert G. Harris and Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing On
the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U Pa L Rev 269 (1979),
with William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Passing On: A Reply to
Harris and Sullivan, 128 U Pa L Rev 1274 (1980). But even if, arguendo, Congress
eventually does overturn the "direct purchaser" limitation, the reasoning of this Comment
would not be affected. The collective action problem explored here is equally applicable to
analysis of harms to consumers as it is to intermediaries.
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in solves the free-rider problem. All dealers pay into a LMDA,
and everyone is better off. Once we acknowledge that some deal-
ers will find it unprofitable to continue their franchise without
the benefit of the tie-in, we appreciate that the tie-in has a bene-
ficial effect on consumer welfare: there are more Lincoln-Mercury
dealers than there would have been without the LMDAs, and
consumers have a greater number of choices. °
Antitrust law should not deem this tie-in illegal, as the ar-
rangement works for the mutual benefit of all involved: end con-
sumers, dealers, and Ford. Just as Nigel and Steve prefer a law
that prevents them from engaging in the self-destructive behav-
ior of polluting, the dealers would prefer to avoid their collective
action problem through the foreclosure of the option of not con-
tributing to a LMDA. Indeed, the record in Miller Motors indi-
cates just that. The LMDAs were established immediately follow-
ing Ford's establishment of a separate Lincoln-Mercury division
in 1946, at the unanimous request of the dealers' elected repre-
sentatives to Ford.41 In fact, dealers pressured Ford into threat-
ening to revoke franchises of recalcitrant dealers who refused to
contribute to advertising funds.42 Also, the record implies that
Miller Motors brought its suit challenging its franchise termina-
tion for reasons other than the LMDA participation require-
ment.'
4. Other cases.
a) Franchising cases. Of course, the Miller Motors sce-
nario is not the only one in which a tying arrangement can solve
40 Note also that the resale price maintenance cases and the Miller Motors case are
analytically the same. The manufacturer's interests vis-a-vis the middleman dealer are
identical to those of the consumer: both want the cost of distribution to be as low as pos-
sible.
The alignment of manufacturer and consumer interests in these cases is important.
Not all resolutions of collective action problems promote consumer welfare. For example, a
cartel may enter into a price-fixing agreement to solve the collective action problem
created by competitive pricing, but such an agreement damages end-consumers; cartel
price-fixing is thus per se illegal. Courts should determine whether collective action
solutions benefit end-consumers (or classes of end-consumers) and not just manufacturers.
41 Miller Motors, 252 F2d at 443.
42Id at 445.
' Quite apart from the LMDA arrangement, the pressures of the auto business
created tension between Miller and Ford. In the face of falling demand for cars, Ford
increased its sales quotas for its franchisees. At the same time, Miller "was not capable of
meeting the keen and ruthless competition which developed .... iller was uncooperative,
critical[, ... and at times abusive, belligerent and threatening." Miller Motors v Ford
Motor Company, 149 F Supp 790, 798 (M D NC 1957).
199A]
The University of Chicago Law Review
a collective action problem. A very common collective action prob-
lem arises in franchising arrangements, and it too can be solved
by a tie-in.
A franchisor licenses franchisees to sell goods, such as fast
food. The efforts of any one franchisee will redound to the benefit
of all; failures in quality or service of any one franchisee will
reflect poorly upon them all. To ensure that individual franchi-
sees will not attempt to free ride off the efforts of the more con-
scientious franchisees by skimping on the quality of the goods
purchased, a franchisor might require, as a condition to granting
the license, the purchase of certain items from distributors who
have a demonstrable level of quality. The franchisor's require-
ment is a prime example of a tie-in for which the tying firm has
no economic interest in the tied product."
This problem is often stated as being a goodwill issue where
the franchisor wants to protect the quality of the franchise brand
name. But such a classification defines the issue too narrowly;
the franchisees want to be bound to maintain a certain level of
quality ex ante. An owner of a Wendy's45 in Columbus does not
want her reputation to be negatively affected by the shoddiness
of a Wendy's in Pittsburgh; nor does the Columbus owner want
to be the only one maintaining a relatively high level of quality
when the effects of that quality will be dispersed amongst the
general reputation of Wendy's restaurants as a whole. Again, the
consumers in this case (the franchisees) would like to have the
option of buying inferior-quality supplies foreclosed to them.
b) Crawford Transport. Crawford Transport v Chrysler
Corp. dealt with Chrysler's vehicle transportation policies.46 Be-
fore changes in Chrysler policy, transporters dealt directly with
Chrysler dealers, soliciting business from them and charging
them shipping costs. About eighty carriers shipped Chrysler cars
" See, for example, Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v Waffle House, Inc., 734 F2d 705, 712
(11th Cir 1984); Keener v Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F2d 453 (5th Cir 1979);
Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F2d 368, 377 (5th Cir
1977). The collective action problem remains the same even where the franchisor does
have an economic interest in the tied goods, as in Siegel v Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F2d
43 (9th Cir 1971), demonstrating the risks in emphasizing the words "economic interest,"
rather than the concept of "economic interest in the tied market." See text accompanying
notes 112-114.
" Or a McDonald's, or a Blockbuster Video, or an Akbar & Jeff's Tofu Hut. Nothing
in this analysis turns on the nutritional value of a Monterey Ranch Chicken Sandwich.
416 338 F2d 934 (6th Cir 1964).
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from manufacturing plants to dealers.' Chrysler decided to
economize on these transportation costs by using only sixteen
carriers, assigned to the dealers by Chrysler, and billing their
costs through Chrysler. Chrysler would then bill a "destination
charge" to its dealers.' A dealer who bought cars from Chrysler
had no choice over the method of transportation despite the exis-
tence of a separate automobile transportation market: the very
definition of a tie-in. But the centralization and consolidation
saved Chrysler (and by extension, its dealers and customers49)
millions of dollars in transportation costs.50
Though this case presents no free-riding opportunities, the
advantage to the dealers (and to consumers) of collectively acting
through Chrysler to arrange transportation is clear. Because of
the cost savings, dealers were unambiguously better off because
of the tie-in even though they lost the opportunity to choose their
own transport company. (It was not the ostensibly-injured Chrys-
ler dealers who brought the suit, but an inferior transport compa-
ny that lost business under the new arrangement.) The collective
action imposed by Chrysler's tie-in gives superior results to con-
sumers compared to a world where such a tie-in is forbidden by
antitrust laws and dealers must individually negotiate transpor-
tation agreements.
c) Town Sound. Town Sound and Custom Tops v Chrys-
ler Motors Corp. 1 is similar to Crawford, except that in this
case, Chrysler had an economic interest in the tied product, auto
stereos. To capture economies of scale, Chrysler began making ste-
reos standard equipment in all of its cars.2 Again, this is tech-
nically a "tie." Here, however, some consumers might prefer to
hold out and insist on a Chrysler package that does not include a
car stereo. Whether or not Chrysler decides to tie, there will be
free riding. If Chrysler does tie, buyers who want a Chrysler car
stereo will free ride off of the benefits obtained by the purchase of
stereos by those consumers who buy a car with a stereo they do
not want. If Chrysler does not tie, buyers who want a choice will
47 Id at 935-36.
48 Id at 936.
4' And, by extension, other automobile consumers who didn't buy Chryslers, but
benefitted from the extra competition Chrysler provided Ford and General Motors at a
time when those two dominated the autoiobile market. Id at 939.
50 Id at 937.
5' 959 F2d 468 (3d Cir 1992).
52 Id at 472-73.
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free ride off of the additional costs imposed upon those who
would prefer a Chrysler car stereo. In either situation, Chrysler
requires one set of consumers to "subsidize" the tastes of another.
But the marketing decision should be dictated by consumers,
capable of purchasing Toyotas or Isuzus if Chrysler does not
create a desirable automobile package, rather than by antitrust
laws prohibiting tie-ins."
d) Thompson. In Thompson v Metropolitan Multi-List, a
multilist real estate listing service required brokers to be mem-
bers of a specific real estate association in order to use the
multilist system.' Metropolitan was wholly owned by the
DeKalb Board of Realtors, and required members to join either
that board or any of a number of other local chapters of the Na-
tional Association of Realtors. The professional affiliation provid-
ed a code of ethics and mandatory arbitration." Brokers would
be unwilling to join a multilist service if such affiliation were not
ensured, because then some brokers could use the multilist serv-
ice unethically and "steal" a sale or customer without the injured
broker having recourse through the realtors' association. If a
broker were able to join the multilist service without subscribing
to such a code of ethics, it would be able to free ride off of the
members who did subscribe. The system would collapse, or, at
best, be impaired significantly.
II. LEGAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The Sherman" and Clayton Acts57 prohibit, among other
things, tie-ins. The original concern over tie-ins was that a legiti-
mate monopoly, such as a patent-holder, might "leverage" its
market power to extend its monopoly into other markets.58 Con-
gress passed Section 3 of the Clayton Act in response to Henry v
' Note the similarities between this and the case of standard airbags. In the days
when airbags were optional, a consumer insisting upon such a feature had to pay hun-
dreds of dollars extra. Due to economies of scale from government-imposed safety stand-
ards, airbags come with all cars at a fraction of that cost, even though some consumers
would no doubt prefer to buy the cheaper automobile without the airbag.
5' 934 F2d 1566 (11th Cir 1991). See also text accompanying notes 120-25.
Id at 1570.
' Sherman Act, 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1 (1988).
57 Clayton Act, 38 Stat 730 (1914), codified as amended at 15 USC § 14 (1988). See
also Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat 717 (1914), codified at 15 USC § 45 (1988).
Kurt A. Strasser, An Antitrust Policy for Tying Arrangements, 34 Emory L J 253,
254 (1985). See, for example, Motion Picture Patents Co. v Universal Film Manufacturing
Co., 243 US 502, 518 (1917).
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A.B. Dick Co., a Supreme Court decision under the Sherman Act
involving a company that sold a mimeograph machine, attaching
the condition that it be used only with ink and paper provided by
the mimeograph machine maker.59 In Motion Picture Patents Co.
v Universal Film Manufacturing Co., its first tie-in case after the
passage of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court held that tying
unpatented items to a patented machine was illegal.0 Since
then, the Court has extended the Sherman Act so that it also
outlaws tie-ins.6
The all-inclusive language of the Sherman Act gives the
courts extremely broad discretion.62 Though the Supreme Court
initially took literally the Sherman Act language condemning
"every" restraint of trade," it soon realized that such a prohibi-
tion was too broad and began the difficult task of deciding which
restraints of trade were unlawful."
A. The Per Se Rule and the Rule of Reason
To narrow the potentially broad range of antitrust litigation,
the Supreme Court established a doctrine under which some
contractual arrangements are considered so unreasonable that
they are illegal as a matter of law.65 These per se classifications
are derived by assessing
[tlhe probability that anticompetitive consequences will
result from a practice and [balancing] the severity of those
consequences ... against its procompetitive consequences.
224 US 1 (1912). The Dick Court held that defendants' sale of ink and paper to a
mimeograph owner constituted contributory infringement of the patent of the mimeograph
machine maker. Id at 11-14. See Clayton Act, HR 15657, 63d Cong, 2d Sess (April 14,
1914), in 51 Cong Rec 16144, 16147 (Oct 5, 1914) (remarks of Senator Walsh).
6 243 US 502, 518 (1917).
61 International Salt Co., 332 US at 396.
' Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." 15 USC § 1 (1988). See
also Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v United States, 221 US 1, 59-60 (1911);
Sullivan and Harrison, Understanding Antitrust and Its Economic Implications § 1.03 at 6
(cited in note 11), quoting 21 Cong Rec 2460 (1890) (remarks of Senator Sherman).
' United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 US 290 (1897). But see
also id at 354 (White dissenting) (criticizing this strict interpretation as an "enormous
injustice").
" See Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 221 US at 60-66 (allowing courts
discretion in determining whether a restraint on trade was reasonable).
' See, for example, United States v Columbia Steel Co., 334 US 495, 522-23 (1948)
(noting, as examples of per se violations, price-fixing agreements, refusals-to-deal, and
conditioning licenses for patented products on the use of unpatented items).
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Cases that do not fit the generalization may arise, but a per
se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not suffi-
ciently common or important to justify the time and expense
necessary to identify them.66
Under the per se rule, therefore, a court does not need to analyze
whether, given particular market conditions, the behavior in
question is indeed anticompetitive. 7
A plaintiff's failure to state a per se illegal claim is not fatal
if she can state a claim under the rule of reason." Under this
approach, the court does not presume illegality. Instead, it in-
quires into the agreement's actual effects on competition.69 Such
an examination permits the use of economic analysis to deter-
mine the effects of a tie-in, but requires more litigation. Once a
plaintiff proves her per se case, on the other hand, a defendant
will be liable even if the particular practice is socially beneficial.
The Supreme Court has, at times, been reluctant to reclassify
practices that it had previously ruled per se illegal as falling
within -the rule of reason, even when lower courts have found the
specific practices procompetitive and beneficial to consumers. °
B. The Supreme Court and Tie-ins
Since the passage of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court has
revisited tie-ins several times. At times, the Court has been espe-
cially critical. Justice Frankfurter once wrote, "Tying arrange-
ments serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of com-
petition."7 The Court first applied the per se rule to tie-ins in
International Salt Co., Inc. v United States, on the grounds that
"it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any
substantial market."72 However, the Court has since retreated
from this severe posture, though not before substantially expand-
ing the reach of tie-in law.7'
Continental T.V., 433 US at 50 n 16.
Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 15-16 n 25.
6 Id at 17-18; Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v United States Steel Corp., 394 US 495, 499-
500 (1969) ("Fortner 1"). ,
Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 29; Fortner I, 394 US at 500.
70 Compare, for example, Arizona v Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 US 332,
351-54 (1982) (disputing the lower court's finding of a procompetitive practice), with
Continental T.V., 433 US at 57-59 (rejecting per se illegality in favor of rule of reason
analysis for vertical restrictions in the face of "substantial authority supporting their
economic utility").
"' Standard Oil Co. of California v United States, 337 US 293, 305-06 (1949).
72 332 US 392, 394, 396 (1947).
See Times-Picayune, 345 US at 608-09 (holding the Clayton Act prohibits tie-ins
[61:639
19941 Antitrust Tie-in Cases
In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v Hyde, a case
involving a hospital's tie of hospital services to anesthesiological
services, the Court stood by a modified per se rule for tie-ins.74
Because buyers often find package sales attractive, "not every
refusal to sell two products separately can be said to restrain
competition."75 In place of International Salt's strict per se rule,
the Court emphasized a more consumer-based standard:
[T]he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrange-
ment lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the
tying product to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied
product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might
have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms."
The practices in question must involve a substantial volume of
commerce to trigger the per se rule.77 Also, the Court empha-
sized that the application of the per se rule should focus "on the
probability of anticompetitive consequences.""
when there is a "monopolistic position" in the market for the tying product or the tie af-
fects a "substantial" volume of commerce in the tied product); Northern Pacific Railway,
356 US at 11 (construing the economic power standard from Times-Picayune's "monopoly
power" to require only "sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable restraint on
free competition"); United States v Loew's Inc., 371 US 38, 45 (1962) ("Even absent a
showing of market dominance, the crucial economic power may be inferred from the tying
product's desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes."); Fortner I, 394
US at 504 (stating economic power exists when "the seller has the power to raise prices,
or impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciable
number of buyers within the market"). Under Fortner I, the mere existence of a tie-in was
in and of itself proof of economic power that would make the tie-in per se illegal. Kenneth
W. Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel: "Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender
Be," 1969 S Ct Rev 1, 18. The Supreme Court softened this position when the Fortner case
came before it a second time. United States Steel Corp. v Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 US
610 (1977) ("Fortner Ir') (holding, despite presence of tie-in, that the plaintiff failed to
show the seller had the requisite economic power to effect an illegal tie-in).
7' 466 US 2 (1983).
7' Id at 11. But see note 27.
76 Id at 12.
Id at 16 ("If only a single purchaser were 'forced' with respect to the purchase of a
tied item, the resultant impact on competition would not be sufficient to warrant the
concern of antitrust law."). what impact would be significant enough to trigger the appli-
cation of antitrust law? One hint might come from Fortner I, where the Supreme Court
defined the necessary impact as "substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to
be merely de minimis." 394 US at 501. In 1969, the Court deemed $190,000 to be substan-
tial enough. Id at 502. Lower courts have disagreed on what is de minimis in this context.
Compare Yentsch v Texaco, Inc., 630 F2d 46, 58 (2d Cir 1980) ($15,000 is probably not
substantial enough), with Tic-X-Press, Inc. v Omni Promotions Company of Georgia, 815
F2d 1407, 1419-20 (11th Cir 1987) ($10,000 is more than de minimis).
78 Jefferson Parish, 446 US at 15-16.
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In a concurrence joined by three other justices, Justice
O'Connor sharply criticized the per se rule in the tie-in context
and urged the Court to abandon it. She noted that the Court, by
its reluctance to rule a tie-in illegal "without proof of market
power or anticompetitive effect,"79 and its willingness to allow
affirmative defenses to per se violations," derived no advantage
at all from the per se rule. In other words, the doctrine as con-
strued by the majority required much of the time-consuming
economic analysis associated with the rule of reason, while still
allowing the prohibition of "arrangements that economic analysis
would show to be beneficial.""' Justice O'Connor also mentioned
the additional danger of lower courts oversimplifying the per se
rule by omitting the necessary economic analysis.82
With this new vague hybrid standard somewhere between
the per se rule and the rule of reason, the Court punted tie-ins
back to the lower courts, leaving the internal contradictions be-
tween legal and economic theory largely unresolved.
C. Controversy Over an Economic Interest Test
While Jefferson Parish's recommendation that courts focus
on the probability of anticompetitive consequences when evaluat-
ing tie-ins is as close as the Court has come to offering an explic-
it threshold for the per se rule, federal appellate courts have
developed their own formulae for identifying illegal tie-ins. In
Yentsch v Texaco, Inc., the Second Circuit developed one influen-
tial test.' To invalidate a tie-in arrangement, Yentsch required
proof of five elements: identification of separate tying and tied
products; "evidence of actual coercion by the seller that in fact
forced the buyer to accept the tied product"; "sufficient economic
power in the tying product market" to make coercion possible;
"anticompetitive effects in the tied market"; and, finally, "involve-
ment of a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce in
the tied product market."" Other courts use similar rules with
only slightly different requirements. Though Yentsch predated
Jefferson Parish, the Supreme Court ignored the effort by the
9 Id at 34 (O'Connor concurring).
Id at 34 n 1, citing United States v Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F Supp 545, 559-
60 (E D Pa 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 US 567 (1961).
"' Id at 34 (O'Connor concurring).
Id at 34-35.
8 630 F2d 46 (2d Cir 1980).
' Id at 56-57, quoting Fortner I, 394 US at 501.
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Second Circuit-as well as attempts by other circuits-to clarify
the tie-in doctrine.
Many circuits have followed Miller Motors' in supplement-
ing their Yentsch-like formulae with an economic interest re-
quirement.8 Over time, however, courts gradually distorted the
Miller Motors economic interest test to mean something com-
pletely different. This trend culminated in a complete rejection of
the Miller Motors test by the Second Circuit.7
The court in Miller Motors-the first to use what has become
known as the economic interest test-referred to the economic in-
terest in the tied product market.88 If there is no showing that
the tier will or can foreclose competition in the tied product mar-
ket, then there can be no leverage, and thus no anticompetitive
danger, even if the tying party earns additional profit from the
tie. For example, in Crawford, Chrysler required dealers to have
their cars shipped by a Chrysler-selected dealer.8 9 The Sixth
Circuit noted:
[Chrysler] did not seek to invade and dominate the automo-
bile transportation carriers' business. True, Chrysler benefit-
ed financially to the extent that it saved millions of dollars
in the cost of transportation[,] but it received no direct prof-
its from the transportation carriers9
As in Miller Motors, the economic interest inquiry focuses, as it
should, on the tier's interest in the tied product market, and
finds an antitrust violation only where the tying seller seeks to
"invade and dominate" the tied product market."
For discussion of Miller Motors, see text accompanying notes 35-43.
See Miller Motors, Inc. v Ford Motor Co., 252 F2d 441, 446-47 (4th Cir 1958);
Crawford Transport Co. v Chrysler Corp., 338 F2d 934, 939 (6th Cir 1964); Venzie Corp. v
United States Mineral Products Co., Inc., 521 F2d 1309, 1317 (3d Cir 1975); Ohio-Sealy
Mattress Manufacturing Co. v Sealy, Inc., 585 F2d 821, 835 (7th Cir 1978); Keener v
Sizzler Family Steak Houses, 597 F2d 453, 456 (5th Cir 1979); Roberts v Elaine Powers
Figure Salons, Inc., 708 F2d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir 1983); Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v Waffle
House, Inc., 734 F2d 705, 712 (11th Cir 1984); Carl Sandburg Village Condominium Asso-
ciation No.1 v First Condominium Development Co., 758 F2d 203, 207-08 (7th Cir 1985);
Beard v Parkview Hospital, 912 F2d 138, 141 (6th Cir 1990); Thompson v Metropolitan
Multi-List, Inc., 934 F2d 1566, 1579 (11th Cir 1991).
"' Gonzalez v St. Margaret's House Housing Development Fund Corp., 880 F2d 1514
(2d Cir 1989).
8 "It is not shown that Ford had any interest in the Kenyon and Eckhardt advertis-
ing agency except to obtain effective advertising service from it." 252 F2d at 446.
89 338 F2d at 936.
80 Id at 939 (emphasis added).
, See Miller Motors, 252 F2d at 446 ("Ford was not using its economic position as an
automobile manufacturer to invade and dominate the advertising business.") (emphasis
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In most tying arrangements, the economic interest compo-
nent is not in controversy, "because the seller of the tying prod-
uct is also the seller of the tied product."92 In other instances,
however, the seller of the tying product is not the seller of the
tied product-a classic example involves a franchisor who re-
quires a franchisee to purchase supplies or equipment from a
specified independent supplier." Here the economic interest test
properly exonerates the franchisor of an illegal tie-in charge.
Indeed, under a common formulation of the economic interest
requirement, the Seventh Circuit has held that "an illegal tying
arrangement will not be found where the alleged tying company
has absolutely no economic interest in the sales of the tied seller,
whose products are favored by the tie-in."' Economic interest
requires more than that the seller receive profit from the tying
arrangement as a whole. 5 Rather, there must be "some form of
economic interest in the sale of the tied product, such as the
receipt of a commission or rebate."96
Certain courts, however, have apparently ignored the origi-
nal purpose of the economic interest test-the prevention of ex-
tension of monopoly power into new arenas-without explaining
why any liability should attach when a tying seller has only an
indirect economic interest in the second market. The first case to
make this misreading was Moore v Jas. H. Matthews & Co.,
where a court found an "economic interest" in commissions on
tied product sales. 7 Moore cites Venzie Corp. v United States
Mineral Products Co., Inc.," for the proposition that a commis-
sion constitutes an economic interest. But what Venzie actually
stated was that not receiving a commission was an indication
added).
In Beard, 912 F2d 138, the Sixth Circuit confirmed that it, unlike the Second Cir-
cuit, does not view the economic interest test as invalidated by Jefferson Parish. The court
found that the economic interest rule, as understood by Crawford, was "consistent with
the fundamental antitrust policy opposing the use of market power in one part of the
economy to acquire power in another part and one to which we are bound as the rule of
this circuit." Id at 143 (footnote omitted).
' Carl Sandburg, 758 F2d at 208, citing Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v Budget
Rent.A-Car Systems, Inc., 732 F2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir 1984).
' See, for example, Midwestern Waffles, Inc., 734 F2d at 710; Kentucky Fried Chick-
en, 549 F2d at 373.
Carl Sandburg, 758 F2d at 207.
5 Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 491 F Supp 1199,
1209 (D Hawaii 1980), aff'd, 732 F2d 1403 (9th Cir 1984); Carl Sandburg, 758 F2d at 208.
' Carl Sandburg, 758 F2d at 208.
97 550 F2d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir 1977).
9 521 F2d 1309 (3d Cir 1975).
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that there was no economic interest; it is certainly not clear that
Venzie held the inverse of that statement to be true.9 Indeed,
Venzie uses the same "invade and dominate" language found in
Miller Motors and Crawford to inform its own definition of eco-
nomic interest." Nonetheless, following Moore, courts have al-
lowed increasingly attenuated links to satisfy the economic in-
terest test.'0 '
While many circuits continue to apply the indirect economic
interest requirement mechanically, the Second Circuit is the first
to have rejected it wholesale.' 2 In Gonzalez v St. Margaret's
House Housing Development Fund Corp., a group of tenants sued
St. Margaret's, a nonprofit housing facility partially subsidized by
the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development."
The facility assessed residents a fee to cover a mandatory daily
meal plan. In dismissing the tenant's antitrust claim, the district
court said: "Because defendant has no economic interest in the
sale of the tied product, an element essential to a claim for illegal
tying is lacking." °'4 The Second Circuit vacated and remanded,
refusing to implement an economic interest test.
The Second Circuit observed in Gonzalez that the rationale
most commonly offered for imposing the economic interest test is
to prevent the risk that "the tying seller will acquire market
power in the tied-product market.""5 But, the court claimed,
Jefferson Parish implicitly rejected the economic interest require-
ment because it "focused primarily on the anticompetitive effect
of tying arrangements," rather than on the seller's market pow-
er."° The Second Circuit may have believed that, had it adopt-
ed the economic interest requirement, it would have weakened
the rule that tying is per se illegal. 07 In making this judgment,
99 Id at 1317.
10 Compare Venzie, 521 F2d at 1317, with Crawford, 338 F2d at 939, and Miller
Motors, 252 F2d at 446.
101 See, for example, Roberts v Elaine Powers Figure Salons, Inc., 708 F2d 1476, 1480-
81 (9th Cir 1983) (claiming a franchisor potentially had an economic interest in the book-
keeping firm which it required franchisees to use); Thompson, 934 F2d at 1579 (finding a
possible economic interest in the services provided by national and state real estate
associations to a local branch).
"02 See Note, 58 Fordham L Rev 1353 (cited in note 8); Casenote, 63 Temple L Rev 595
(cited in note 8).
103 880 F2d 1514, 1515 (2d Cir 1989).
104 Id at 1516.
100 Id at 1517.
0 Id, citing Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 14-15.
007 The Gonzalez court noted that [ilt does not seem [ that a majority of the Su-
preme Court has as yet cut back on the application of tie-in doctrine by incorporating the
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however, the court did not acknowledge the Supreme Court's
statement in NCAA v Board of Regents that per se rules may
require considerable economic analysis "before the evidence justi-
fies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct." °8
Alternatively, the Gonzalez court suggested that St.
Margaret's might, in fact, have had an economic interest in the
meal program. Yet while St. Margaret's did receive money for
providing the meal service, it not only did not earn a profit on the
service-federal regulations forbade such profit-but it actually
operated the meal plan at a loss, charging the residents less for
the meal program than what it paid to the outside contractor.' °9
The Gonzalez court seems simply to have been uncomfortable
finding that there was a "lack of 'economic interest' in a situation
where the same party actually sold the tying and the tied prod-
uct directly to the consumer.""' Thus, merely conveying pay-
ments as a middleman barred St. Margaret's from claiming that
it had no economic interest.
Gonzalez thus stands for the twin propositions that: (1) Jef-
ferson Parish casts serious doubt on the validity of an economic
interest requirement for illegal tie-ins; and (2) even if the eco-
nomic interest inquiry survives Jefferson Parish, the most atten-
uated of financial interests can constitute an "economic interest."
In effect, these two propositions merge into one, for if an interest
as insubstantial as that of St. Margaret's can represent an "eco-
nomic interest," it would seem that no tying arrangement could
be protected by the economic interest test. In virtually any tie-in
there is a remote interest of some sort. If there were no economic
benefit to the tier for tying, why would the tier choose to tie in
the first place?"'
[economic interest test]." Id at 1517.
10 465 US 85, 104 n 26 (1984). See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v Columbia Broadcast-
ing Systems, Inc., 441 US 1, 19 (1979) (joint selling arrangement by holders of copyrights
on musical compositions is not a per se restraint of trade).
'0 Gonzalez, 880 F2d at 1515.
10 Id at 1517.
.. "Economic benefit" in economic theory does not necessarily mean wealth-maximiz-
ing in the case of an individual or non-profit corporation. In the Gonzalez scenario, a non-
profit enterprise might achieve intangible, or "psychic," economic benefit from the meal
plan. In an earlier challenge to the meal plan, the district court found that:
The specified purposes of the meal plan were to ensure proper nutrition, encourage
social interaction and a sense of community, and allow management to identify
residents' health problems as they arise.
Gonzalez v St. Margaret's House Housing Development Fund Corp., 668 F Supp 187, 189
(S D NY 1987), aff'd 848 F2d 391 (2d Cir 1988) (per curiam).
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The Second Circuit's willingness to view St. Margaret's insig-
nificant financial stake in the meal plan as an economic interest
is the inevitable result of the gradual distortion of the economic
interest test. In Miller Motors and Crawford, the courts used a
definition of "economic interest" that properly concentrated on
the motivations behind the test-whether the plaintiff was at-
tempting to invade and dominate the tied product market. A
court applying Moore's superficial understanding of the words
"economic interest," rather than the reasoning behind Crawford's
use of the test,"' could have found in Miller Motors that Ford
had an economic interest in Kenyon and Eckhardt's advertising if
Ford received an unrelated discount for the volume of advertising
purchased. Such an attenuated finding of economic interest may
seem implausible, but the Gonzalez court did something similar
when it suggested that St. Margaret's might have had an eco-
nomic interest in the meal plan because it actually sold it."' In
the broadest definition of the term, everyone has an economic
interest in the goods they tie."4
III. THE ECONOMIC INTEREST TEST: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
This Section examines how the Miller Motors test lost its
moorings, resulting in the rejection of the economic interest test
in Gonzalez. It proposes both a return to the Miller Motors in-
vade-and-dominate standard and an expansion of this standard
to exclude other types of beneficial tie-ins from the harsh per se
rule. Subsection A assesses how Miller Motors might come out
under the current version of the economic interest test, thereby
demonstrating how distorted the doctrine has become. Subsection
B critiques Gonzalez's rejection of the economic interest test.
Subsection C critizes the Moore version of the economic interest
requirement. Subsection D finds that the invade-and-dominate
standard fits comfortably within the Jefferson Parish framework.
1 Moore's mistake resembles the improper analogies drawn by the Supreme Court in
the context of resale price maintenance. See Posner, Antitrust Law at 164-65 (cited in
note 10).
113 Gonzalez, 880 F2d at 1515, 1517.
1 Some courts may be using the economic interest test as a proxy for a goodwill
defense. As we saw earlier, protecting goodwill in a manufacturer-dealer relationship is
just another form of the collective action problem. See text accompanying notes 44-45.
Goodwill is a legitimate reason for creating tie-ins but is not a defense to a charge of
illegal tying. Standard Oil Co. of California v United States, 337 US 293, 306 (1949) ("The
only situation [ I in which the protection of goodwill may necessitate the use of tying
clauses is where specifications for a substitute would be so detailed that they could not
practicably be supplied.").
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Finally, subsection E argues for an extension of the invade-and-
dominate standard to other tie-in cases, using International Salt
to examine the implications that such an expansion would have.
A. Miller Motors and Today's Economic Interest Test
There is no economic reason to declare the Miller Motors tie-
in illegal."5 It benefits both seller and buyer, and even the end
consumer; indeed, the Fourth Circuit invented the economic in-
terest test in order to exonerate Ford."6 But such a tie-in would
be found per se illegal under the Second Circuit's understanding
of the economic interest test in Gonzalez: Ford Motors coerced in-
dividual dealers to buy advertising from a third party, foreclosing
a substantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied product
market.
The Miller Motors court probably viewed the economic inter-
est test as a way to segregate "bad" tie-ins from "good" tie-ins.
Even if Kenyon and Eckhardt were a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Ford, Miller Motors might still have reached the same result
because the court found that "substantial advantages inured to
the dealers through the device of a single advertising pro-
gram."" '7 So the economic interest test as originally articulated
in Miller Motors reaches the right result in this case. Ford had
no interest in the tied market of advertising; it had no desire or
ability to invade and dominate the advertising market, as the
test originally required.
This indicates that the current economic interest test-which
amounts to an "indirect economic interest" test-is not the opti-
mal legal approach. Assume, for instance, that Kenyon granted
Ford a discount for steering the LMDA business to it. This would
be even more beneficial to both Ford and its consumers (dealers),
115 For that matter, one might question whether even to call the practice in Miller
Motors a tie-in. Ford could have achieved the same result by simply raising the price of
its cars, rather than adding a separate surcharge, in which case Miller Motors could have
no complaint. So why did Ford segregate the advertising costs? The record does not
indicate. Perhaps Ford could not have effectively internalized the price of the LMDA fund
into the automobile; there were twenty separate LMDA funds run by dealers' associations,
and their assessments varied greatly. Miller Motors, 252 F2d at 444. Ford might have run
afoul of price-discrimination laws if it had charged different prices for the same automo-
bile. Though this may not be an entirely satisfactory explanation, it illustrates the prob-
lems that arise in antitrust when judges try to second-guess business decisions. See
generally Easterbrook, 76 Georgetown L J 305 (cited in note 9).
116 252 F2d at 446.
117 Id. Note, however, that actual economic benefit would be quite irrelevant under a
pure per se rule.
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for they would receive the same services at a lower cost. But this
benefit would be an indirect economic interest if, as indeed was
the case, Ford did other business with Kenyon."8 Consequently,
the current test would prohibit the arrangement.
A court applying either a "direct" or "indirect" economic in-
terest test without recognizing the "invade and dominate" stand-
ard would also fail to distinguish the counterfactual case in
which Ford does own Kenyon, even though the economic result is
indistinguishable from the case where Ford has no economic
interest in the advertising agency."9 Ford might have tried to
integrate vertically by having in-house advertising-this, too,
would be mutually beneficial, but would be considered a direct
economic interest. Thus, the Moore indirect economic interest test
is not a good device for sorting the "good" tie-ins from the
"bad'"-but neither is a test that focuses solely on the direct eco-
nomic interest of the seller. Only a test that requires the seller to
have an intention to invade and dominate the tied product mar-
ket would reach the right result.
The failings of the Moore test can be seen first-hand in
Thompson v Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc. ° There, Metropolitan
required brokers wishing to use its multi-listing real estate serv-
ice to be a member of a local branch of the National Association
of Realtors, whose members subscribed to a common code of
ethics-a practice somewhat akin to the Martindale-Hubbell
directory requiring lawyers listed within to be a member of the
bar. '2 Metropolitan used this tie-in to avoid the free-riding
problems that would result if non-member brokers could "steal"
customers from member brokers without fear of violating the
code of ethics or being sanctioned by the association.'
Using an "absolutely no interest" variation of the economic
interest test, the Eleventh Circuit found enough economic inter-
est to preclude summary judgment for the defendants. Its reason-
ing: subscribers to the multi-listing services paid $175 in annual
dues to the local realtors' association. In turn, the realtors' asso-
11' The record is unclear whether Ford received any sort of volume discount for the
work done by Kenyon.
1 In Miller, each dealer association "was free to select its own advertising counsel,
but all ... chose the firm of Kenyon and Eckhardt because it was doing the [Lincoln-
Mercury] institutional advertising." 252 F2d at 444. In short, the dealers' choice of an
advertising firm was effectively dictated by Ford.
'2 934 F2d 1566 (11th Cir 1991).
121 Id at 1570.
122 See text accompanying notes 54-55.
1994]
The University of Chicago Law Review
ciations paid a portion of those dues to state and national
realtors' associations of which the DeKalb Board of Realtors,
which owned Metropolitan, was a dues-paying local branch.'"
The resulting pennies of benefit that could be attributed to Met-
ropolitan represented enough of an economic interest for the
Eleventh Circuit to impose potential liability.
In a circuit that might consider the Miller Motors or Thomp-
son tie-ins illegal, a company in the position of Ford could try to
avoid tie-in prosecution altogether by simply charging more for
car dealerships and not charging separately for the advertis-
ing. 4 But while charging a higher price would not be illegal, it
may be inefficient, because Ford would have less input from the
dealers' associations as to advertising, and coordinating local and
national campaigns would be more difficult. Furthermore, a court
such as Gonzalez might very well try to unravel the transaction
to find the tie-in of advertising. Indeed, the Thompson court
seemed to indicate that it would have done just that had Metro-
politan structured itself to avoid the third-party tie-in.'25 Alter-
natively, Ford could have foregone franchising and vertically
integrated its dealerships into the larger firm. The vertical inte-
gration would be judged under the rule of reason, 6 even
though vertical integration and tying arrangements constitute
"alternate means of obtaining precisely the same results" for
many monopolists.'27  Thus, the prohibition against tie-ins
might only deflect a firm from a more-efficient illegal practice to
a legal one that offers consumers the same options, but at a high-
er cost.'
Under the invade-and-dominate standard, however, a court
could recognize the good chance that the tie-in is procompetitive,
and thus subject to the rule of reason rather than the per se
rule."'29 In practice, this would enable Ford to introduce evi-
'2 934 F2d at 1579.
Metropolitan made precisely this argument, to no avail, in the Eleventh Circuit. Id
at 1575.
'2 Id at 1576-78.
"2 Brown Shoe Co. Inc. v United States, 370 US 294 (1962). But see Ford Motor Co. v
United States, 405 US 562 (1972) (proof of significant foreclosure and industry concentra-
tion is enough to create prima facie case).
' See Roger D. Blair and David L. Kaserman, Vertical Integration, Tying, and
Antitrust Policy, 68 Am Econ Rev 397, 401 (1978).
'" Id. See also Posner, Antitrust Law at 178 (cited in note 10).
'2' Miller Motors, 252 F2d at 446-47. At least one commentator has suggested that a
per se legality rule would be preferable in many cases to a rule of reason. Easterbrook, 76
Georgetown L J at 310-11 (cited in note 9).
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dence that its tie-in is intended to resolve the collective action
problem. Winning summary judgment would be more difficult.
Although resolving the collective action problem is a rational
explanation for Ford's behavior, presenting this abstract theory
alone is probably not enough to support a summary judgment
under the current Supreme Court antitrust doctrine presented in
Eastman -Kodak Co. v Image Technical Services, Inc.' But a
court using the proper formulation of the economic interest test
would note that the plaintiff failed to show that Ford was at-
tempting to invade and dominate the advertising business, and
could dismiss the case on a summary judgment motion.''
The economic interest test, like any threshold definition, is
only useful if it is an effective way of sorting good from bad "tie-
ins." A definition that is over- or under-inclusive will result in
mischaracterizations. As the Miller Motors example shows, the
economic interest test can be underinclusive. Had Ford chosen to
run the advertising campaign internally, the economic interest
test would not have protected it-even though the risk that Ford
would monopolize the advertising industry was nonexistent, and
even though Ford's practices were procompetitive. Charging a
higher price would not violate tie-in laws, but might have created
inefficiencies, as Ford would not have been able to pass on re-
gional advertising costs in the areas of the country that had more
intensive campaigns.
B. Where Gonzalez Went Wrong
The Second Circuit did not adequately support its rejection of
the economic interest test in Gonzalez.' Although Gonzalez
mentioned that the economic interest test addresses the fear of lever-
age, and noted Jefferson Parish's concern over the impairment of
competition in the tied market,' the court failed to indicate
why it necessarily follows that a defendant who ties without an
'30 112 S Ct 2072, 2083 (1992) ("[Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 US 574 (1986)] did not hold that if the moving party enunciates any
economic theory supporting its behavior, regardless of its accuracy in reflecting the actual
market, it is entitled to summary judgment.").
13 This is a somewhat different question from whether a prerequisite to liability
should be the seller having sufficient market power in the tying product market to suc-
cessfully dominate the tied market, which is an issue beyond the scope of this Comment.
See discussion and sources cited in Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v Chrysler Motors
Corp., 959 F2d 468, 482-85 & n 23 (3d Cir 1982) (discussing the controversy over whether
to require market power in the tying product market).
13 880 F2d 1514.
' Id at 1517.
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economic interest should be subject to the per se rule. The per se
rule, as the Supreme Court has said, is meant to apply to a cate-
gory where it is so probable that the arrangement in question
violates antitrust law that it is not worth judicial effort to inquire
further into individual cases for possible exceptions.' A prac-
tice that presents no danger of leverage could hardly fall into
such a category. Ironically, Gonzalez's confusion over the per se
rule for tying validates Justice O'Connor's fears about misappli-
cation of the rule in the tying context."5 Gonzalez implies that
imposing an additional threshold to reach the per se rule would
"cut back" on the application of tie-in doctrine.16 But despite its
name, the per se rule is no longer an absolute in tying cases. If
the threshold of the economic interest test makes sense, it does
not weaken the per se rule.'37 Rather, it improves the accuracy
of the rule by increasing the chances that the cases it covers are
indeed so likely to be anticompetitive that further inquiry is
unnecessary.
C. The Moore Economic Interest Test In Practice Today
Had the Second Circuit taken the analysis in Gonzalez a step
further, it could have demonstrated that there is little correlation
between whether the tier has an indirect economic interest in the
tied market and whether the tie-in should be illegal. In Miller
Motors, it was economically irrelevant whether Ford had or had
not vertically integrated with the Kenyon advertising agency, but
this seems a poor thing to have a case turn on. Should Miller Mo-
tors mind whether it is Ford or Kenyon that gets paid for adver-
tising?
Part of the problem arises from Moore's vague understanding
of "economic interest," the scope of which can be as broad as
courts want, depending on how direct or indirect the interest
13 Continental T.V., Inc. v GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 US 36, 50 n 16 (1977).
nM [TMhe per se label in the tying context has generated more confusion than coherent
law because it appears to invite lower courts to omit the analysis of the economic circum-
stances of the tie that has always been a necessary element of tying analysis.".Jefferson
Parish, 466 US at 34-35 (O'Connor concurring).
136 Gonzalez, 880 F2d at 1517.
" Note, 58 Fordham L Rev at 1362 (cited in note 8), makes the same mistake as
Gonzalez. The claim that the per se rule without an economic interest test simplifies
analysis is false because the defendant can rebut the presumption by showing the tie to
be beneficial, and the court will engage in the same sort of inquiry as it would were the
per se rule weaker. The claim is only true when no rebuttal is allowed. Indeed, even
under Gonzalez, a court must make threshold inquiries to determine whether a tie is per
se illegal., 880 F2d at 1516.
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is.' Yet many other courts share Moore's unprecedented and unsup-
ported view of what constitutes economic interest."9
Perhaps courts use the vagueness of Moore's economic inter-
est approach to get around the per se rule because the existing
rule also does a poor job of distinguishing good tie-ins from bad.
Judges might be using a shifting economic interest test to avoid
declaring efficient tie-ins illegal under the per se rule. 40 If so,
this situation is not without precedent. Judge Bork has suggested
that the threshold inquiry of whether one good or two goods are
being sold is really a poor attempt by courts to exclude efficient
tying arrangements from antitrust liability.'
If judges are indeed using a shifting economic interest test as
a filter for beneficial tie-ins, what are the implications? For indi-
vidual cases, judges might be attempting-unsuccessfully-to
avoid unjust results. They are using what might be a bad rule to
avoid applying another bad rule. At the same time, though, they
create inconsistent precedents that have little or no predictive
value for parties. This lack of certainty will lead to more litiga-
tion,' which, in turn, could lead to other unjust results. For
example, sellers might be just as reluctant to engage in beneficial
tie-ins under a shifting test as under an over-inclusive per se
rule. In this context, perhaps the economic dislocation from the
simpler per se rule would be preferable to the legal and economic
dislocation from the inconsistent application of Moore's version of
the economic interest test.' Better than either option, howev-
er, would be to devise a more coherent system.
D. The Economic Interest Test and Supreme Court Doctrine
The Supreme Court has come a long way since it declared
that tie-ins "serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition."' Now it admits that "there is nothing inherently
550 F2d at 1216.
See, for example, Thompson, 934 F2d at 1579.
"4 One commentator suggests that this is the rationale behind Venzie. Casenote, 63
Temple L Rev at 605 & n 81 (cited in note 8).
141 Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 370-71 (cited at note 10). See, for example, Times-
Picayune, 345 US 594, and text accompanying note 21.
142 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 20.2 at 540-42 (Little, Brown, 4th
ed 1992).
" See, for example, Easterbrook, 76 Georgetown L J at 306 (cited in note 9) (noting
that judges and juries are poor decision makers when it comes to judging the competitive
effects of complex business practices).
144 Standard Oil, 337 US at 305-06.
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anticompetitive about packaged sales."45 The Court has nar-
rowed tie-in doctrine somewhat, but elements of the per se ille-
gality rule remain.'46 Thus, one needs to consider what it is
about tie-ins that still concerns the Court. Jefferson Parish is the
most recent case to explore tie-in doctrine fully.
While Gonzalez found it telling that there was no require-
ment of economic interest in Jefferson Parish,'47 a more plausi-
ble reason that the Supreme Court did not directly address the
economic interest issue is the lack of a finding of a separate prod-
uct market for anesthesiologists.' Indirect economic interest,
as in many tie-in cases, was not at all in dispute. The hospital
had a financial interest in its anesthesiologists. A close reading of
Supreme Court doctrine finds not only that Jefferson Parish
would condone an economic interest requirement, but that it
would prefer Miller Motors's emphasis on the tied product mar-
ket to Moore's implicit focus on indirect financial interest in the
sale. Indeed, the Court ruled for the defendant because "there
has been no showing that the market as a whole has been affect-
ed at all" by the tie-in.'
Recall that the Jefferson Parish Court's main concern was
"the probability of anticompetitive consequences." 5 ' In a foot-
note, the Court cited language in Justice White's dissent in
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v United States Steel Corp. ("Fortner ")
that suggests the Court's support for the Miller Motors emphasis
on the tied product market:
[Tihe fundamental restraint against which the tying pro-
scription is meant to guard is the use of power over one
product to attain power over another, or otherwise to distort
freedom of trade and competition in the second product. This
distortion injures the buyers of the second product, who
because of their preference for the seller's brand of the first
are artificially forced to make a less than optimal choice in
the second .... In addition to these anticompetitive effects
in the tied product, tying arrangements may be used to
evade price control in the tying product through clandestine
145 Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 25.
146 Id at 32 (Brennan concurring) (claiming that per se illegality is "settled statutory
interpretation" that only Congress can modify).
'47 Gonzalez, 880 F2d at 1517.
14 See Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 18-25.
141 Id at 31.
s Id at 15-16.
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transfer of the profit to the tied product; they may be used
as a counting device to effect price discrimination ...."'
The Court does recognize possible harms from tying, apart from
the foreclosure of competitors, such as regulation evasion and
price discrimination. But in the end, "any inquiry into the validi-
ty of a tying arrangement must focus on the market or markets in
which the two products are sold, for that is where the
anticompetitive forcing has its impact."152 Price discrimination
or regulation evasion alone is not enough to ban a tie-in; there
must be an anticompetitive effect in the tied product market.
Again:
[T]he law draws a distinction between the exploitation of
market power by merely enhancing the price of the tying
product, on the one hand, and by attempting to impose re-
straints on competition in the market for a tied product, on
the other. When the seller's power is just used to maximize
its return in the tying product market ... the competitive
ideal of the Sherman Act is not necessarily compromised.'53
However, to permit that power to be used "to impair competi-
tion on the merits in another market" would be to condone "the
existence of power that a free market would not tolerate."54
Not only does Jefferson Parish focus attention on the tied product
market, it says that the Sherman Act does not prohibit a seller
from using its power to maximize its return in the tying product
market rather than to restrain trade in the tied product market.
This emphasis is precisely what the invade-and-dominate stand-
ard aims for. An indirect economic interest is no more than an
attempt by the seller to "maximize its return in the tying product
market,"'55 and is thus not necessarily illegal; certainly not ille-
gal per se. Furthermore, where there is no attempt to invade and
dominate the market, there is no anticompetitive effect; where
there is no anticompetitive effect on the tied product market, the
tie should be deemed legal.15
6
151 Id at 13 n 19, quoting Fortner I, 394 US at 512-14 (White dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
152 Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 18 (emphasis added).
5 Id at 14 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Beard, 912 F2d at 142.
154 Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 14, 15, quoting Fortner II, 429 US at 617.
'5 Id at 14.
" Gonzalez cites Parts and Electric Motors, Inc. v Sterling Electric, Inc., 826 F2d 712,
718 (7th Cir 1987), for the proposition that Jefferson Parish does not endorse an economic
interest test because of the following language:
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E. Solutions: Returning To and Expanding the Invade-and-
Dominate Standard
Jefferson Parish does not mandate the standard proposed by
this Comment. After all, if it did, the Court would have adopted
an invade-and-dominate standard for tie-in cases across the
board. Still, the invade-and-dominate standard is consistent with
Court doctrine, and, in fact, is best suited to reach results the
Court would find desirable. If antitrust tying doctrine is meant to
prevent extension of monopoly power, this would seem to justify
such an economic interest test. If the real danger in tying is that
it helps extend monopoly power, and if there is no interest in the
tied product market, then there is no danger. A congresional
policy reflecting the "great concern about the anticompetitive
character of tying arrangements" hardly justifies applying the
Clayton Act to tie-ins that cannot be proven to be anti-
competitive.'
If the economic interest test were reformulated to the origi-
nal definition of "invade and dominate," it would nicely push
most tie-ins to a rule of reason analysis, or result in a dismissal
on summary judgment motion. In this sense, Moore got it precise-
ly backwards. Rather than using the economic interest test to
bludgeon defendants who have an indirect economic interest,
courts should expand the economic interest test to require a
showing that the defendant seeks to "invade and dominate" the
tied product market for a plaintiff's case to survive a summary
judgment motion. Though such a standard raises the antitrust
hurdle for plaintiffs, it is an easier burden to meet than the
Court's standard for attempted monopolization cases under Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.15 8
The tying seller may be working toward a monopoly position in the tied product and,
even if he is not, the practice of tying forecloses other sellers of the tied product and
makes it more difficult for new firms to enter that market.
Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 13 n 19, quoting Fortner I, 394 US at 513 (White dissenting).
This reading of the White dissent is too strong. Where there is no attempt to invade the
tied product market, there is no foreclosure of competition. One casebook on antitrust
comments:
The producer of the tying product has no incentive to disturb the structure of the
tied-product market so long as the producers of the tied product are efficient and
competitive, for he wants to minimize the cost of that product .... The monopolist
will welcome competition in production of the tied product.
Posner and Easterbrook, Antitrust at 807 (cited in note 23).
Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 10.
" See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v McQuillan, 113 S Ct 884, 890-91 (1993) (holding that a
monopolization claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act requires both a specific intent to
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International Salt59 illustrates the usefulness of extending
the invade-and-dominate standard. International Salt owned a
patent on a machine that processed rock salt. It conditioned the
lease of the machine on a promise by the machine's lessees to
purchase salt from it.60 As a result, International Salt obtained
a four-percent share of the relevant salt market. 6' The Court
ruled the tie-in per se illegal,'62 without inquiring into how
much of that market share was due to the tie, and without a
determination that the four-percent share might cause monopoly
problems. The Court simply argued that "[tihe volume of busi-
ness affected by these contracts cannot be said to be insignificant
or insubstantial."6 ' It did not consider whether there was any
effect on the market as a whole, noting merely that "the tendency
of the arrangement to accomplishment of monopoly seems obvi-
ous. i 16
4
Yet, users of the salt-processing machine comprised only a
small portion of the rock-salt market. International Salt had no
intent to invade and dominate the salt market, and could not be
said to have any economic interest in the tied product market.
Applying Jefferson Parish and an invade-and-dominate standard,
the International Salt tie-in would not be per se illegal. The tie-in
could still be analyzed under the rule of reason to explore wheth-
er International Salt had engaged in price discrimination with
anticompetitive effects.
Section I identified several other legitimate reasons why a
seller might engage in a tie-in that was beneficial. When the tie-
in is for purposes of non-discriminatory measurement of use,
preserving goodwill, or taking advantage of economies of scale,
the tying firm is not attempting to invade and dominate the tied
product market, nor is it engaging in practices that harm con-
sumers or competition.'65 The invade-and-dominate standard
would exclude many of these innocuous tie-ins from per se ille-
gality.
monopolize and a "dangerous probability" of achieving market power).
" 332 US at 394. See also Bork, Antitrust Paradox at 367-69 (cited in note 10); John
L. Peterman, The International Salt Case, 22 J L & Econ 351 (1979).
16 332 US at 393-94.
16 Peterman, 22 J L & Econ at 351.
'6 332 US at 396.
16 Id at 386.
'"Id at 396.
1 See text accompanying notes 22-27.
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CONCLUSION
In Miller Motors, Ford used a tie-in to solve a collective ac-
tion problem. The Fourth Circuit recognized that traditional
concerns over leverage did not apply because Ford was not at-
tempting to dominate the advertising market. The Court thus ex-
cluded the tie-in from the per se rule on an economic interest
theory. Nothing economic turns on whether Ford had a direct or
indirect economic interest in the advertising agency. The tie-in is
equally innocuous in either situation. Unfortunately, by
characterizing Miller Motors's "invade and dominate" approach as
an "economic interest" test, other courts have misunderstood the
point of the case and have whittled the economic interest test to
nothing. As a result, other attempts to avoid the collective action
problem, as in Thompson, have resulted in potential legal liabili-
ty; perfectly harmless tie-ins could not command a successful
summary judgment motion. A proper reading of the "economic
interest" test as an "invade and dominate" test would exclude
many beneficial tie-ins from the per se rule and use instead the
rule of reason to explore any anticompetitive effects of the partic-
ular tie at issue.
Under both the per se rule and the rule of reason, a plaintiff
must establish a substantial danger that the seller will use the
tie-in to acquire market power in the tied product market.'66
The Moore "indirect economic interest" test might be said to be com-
ing at the problem from the wrong direction. The court in Miller
Motors recognized that Ford's tie-in was not just harmless, but
beneficial, and devised the economic interest test to keep the tie-
in from being declared illegal. Other courts have noted that there
is no economic difference between direct and indirect economic
interest. Nevertheless, as in Moore, instead of excluding direct
economic interests from per se illegality, they have included
indirect economic interests. The economic interest test from Mill-
er Motors was misnamed, then misread, misapplied, and mis-
used.
Fortunately, Jefferson Parish is open-ended enough to allow
lower courts a great deal of discretion to use a more economically
sensible standard. Courts should return to the Miller Motors
"invade and dominate" economic interest standard. Under this
standard, tie-ins for which no Jefferson Parish non-leverage harm
1 Jefferson Parish, 466 US at 31; Carl Sandburg Village Condominium Association
No. 1 v First Condominium Development Co., 758 F2d 203, 207, 210 (7th Cir 1985).
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is alleged should be ruled per se legal. Relying on an "indirect
economic interest" test stands the reasoning behind the economic
interest test on its head, and is an inappropriate judicial stand-
ard inconsistent with prior appeals court decisions and with
Jefferson Parish. On the contrary, the invade-and-dominate test
should be expanded to reach cases where there is a traditional
direct economic interest. Courts could judge such defendants by
the rule of reason test, examining actual effects on the tied prod-
uct market instead of declaring potentially benign practices per
se illegal.

